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Abstract 
 
The present paper seeks to examine why the Nordic countries performed better than most 
other Western countries during the 1930s, when they at the same time experienced high 
unemployment levels. The conclusions drawn here are that the early abandonment of 
gold and the adoption of a more inflationary monetary policy serve as the key explanation 
to the relatively mild Nordic depression and the rapid recovery. However, the paradox of 
persistently high unemployment remains. By international comparisons the paper shows  
that these rather can be explained by a positive shift in labour supply than the scale of the 
depression. The analysis in the paper also reveals that Sweden performed more like 
continental Europe in respect of both the depression and the labour market. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the early 1930s the world saw the strongest and most devastating international 
depression in modern economic history. GDP fell dramatically in most capitalist 
economies, in some communist countries, e.g. the Soviet Union, people were starving 
and suffering from under and malnutrition. In consequence of negative shifts in product 
demand, also demand for labour shifted inwards. The result was mass unemployment, 
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underemployment and falling standards of living for millions of families loosing their 
regular income.  
 
Despite these hardships, some groups maintained and even increased their standard of 
living, e.g. manufacturing and construction workers in many European countries, who did 
not loose their jobs. The same was the case for labour in new service industries, which 
were in fact quite successful during the 1930s. Some economies also experienced a 
surprisingly mild depression in the early 1930s compared to others. 1 Among these were 
the Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In this paper these 
economies are called The Nordic Four (N4). Admittedly, they faced a significant 
decrease in GDP and a correspondingly increase in unemployment. However, the crisis 
was milder and shorter than in most other Western economies at the time, i.e. GDP and 
prices fell less and the recovery was faster. However, despite the relatively rapid recovery 
in production, unemployment stayed persistently high throughout the decade. 
 
The present paper seeks to explain this dilemma: In the first place we ask, why was the 
depression milder and shorter, and why was the recovery more rapid in the N4 than in 
most other countries? Second, given the good performance of the N4, why did 
unemployment persist on very high levels until the Second World War? 
 
To answer these two questions the paper firstly presents a brief overview of the 
development of GDP, prices and unemployment in the N4 during the interwar period. In 
order to do this we present comparable PPP-figures derived from an ongoing project, 
which aims at harmonising historical national accounts for all the Nordic countries, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. This is done in order to give an 
overview of comparative levels of income and scale of economic crises.  
 
Unemployment figures for the years prior to the Second World War are imprecise. Thus, 
the paper goes on to map the scale of unemployment in the Nordic countries during the 
                                                
1 P. Scholliers and V. Zamagni, Labour’s Reward: Real wages and economic change in 19th and 20th 
century Europe, (London 1995). 
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1930s by presenting new and revised figures for the countries in question. By doing this, 
the paper offers valid and comparable figures for unemployment in the over-all labour 
forces of the N4.  
 
Thirdly, the paper seeks to examine why the N4 had relatively mild and short 
depressions. This can of course be due to both market forces on the supply and the 
demand side on the one hand and economic policy on the other. In this paper we give an 
overview of the effect of economic policy, with emphasis on monetary policy on the 
economic performance.  
 
Finally, the paper aims at explaining the persistently high unemployment during the rapid 
Nordic recovery in the 1930s with view both to the demand and the supply side of the 
labour market. In order to answer our two questions we use an international comparative 
approach with data from 17 western economies, the N4 included. 
 
The Nordic economic performance in the 1930s  
 
The Nordic economies were like all Western economies, seriously hit by the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. However, when the Nordic countries experienced a more severe 
set-back during the international post First World War-crisis in the early 1920s than most 
other Western countries, the crisis of the 1930s was milder than for most other 
economies. Chart 1 describes the level and duration of the inter-war crises in the N4 in 
terms of reconciled GDP per capita in purchasing power parities (PPPs). The figures are 
estimated on the basis of the UN 2005 calculations of world wide GDP figures expressed 
in PPPs of 2003, by prolongation back in time through harmonised historical national 
account series.2 Thus, they give a representative and comparable view of both level and 
development of GDP per capita in the N4. 
                                                
2 R. Hjerppe, Riitta, Finland’s Historical national Accounts 1860-1994 , (Jyväskylä 1976), O. Krantz, Olle, 
Swedish Historical National Accounts, (Umeå 2001), O.H. Grytten, ”The gross domestic product for 
Norway, 1830-2003” Ø. Eitrheim, J.T. Klovland and J.F. Qvigstad (eds), Historical Monetary Statistics for 
Norway 1819-2003 , (Oslo 2003), pp. 241-288, S.A. Hansen, Økonomisk vækst i Danmark , (København 
1977), pp. 237-260. For alternative GDP figures for Sweden, however, basically in line with those used 
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The chart firstly reveals huge differences in per capita income in he Nordic countries 
during the period. Denmark was clearly ahead of Norway and Sweden, when Finland 
lagged significantly behind the others. The differences were lower in relative terms at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. However, they were still too high and the closing 
of the gap too marginal to call the development convergence. Denmark remained by far 
the wealthiest of the Nordic countries, when Finland remained the poorest. It took 
Finland twenty years to obtain the same per capita income level as Denmark had in its 
worst recession year in 1918. The level at Denmark’s lowest point during the post-war 
depression in the early 1920s was not permanently achieved in Norway and Sweden until 
the mid-1930s. As for Finland, they obtained the same level not until after the Second 
World War.  
 
Chart 1. GDP per capita in PPP 2003 US$ for the N4 1910-1940. 
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Sources, UN 2005, Krantz 2001, Hjerppe 1996, Grytten 2004, Hansen 1977, Maddison 2003. 
 
Also, according to the chart the economic problems in the N4 must have been deeper in 
the period during and after the First World War than during the 1930s. Table 1 reports the 
                                                                                                                                             
here: R. Edvinsson, Growth, Accumulation, Crisis: With New Macroeconomic Data for Sweden 1800-2000, 
(Stockholm 2005). 
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decline in GDP per capita between their peak and bottom years during the main inter-war 
business cycles.  
 
For all the four countries the strongest recession hit during wartime, with falls between 
13.5 and 34.7 per cent in per capita GDP. Denmark, Norway and Sweden, were all 
neutral, and experienced similar declines. As for Finland, the situation was dramatically 
worse. This was basically due to the Russian involvement in the First World War. 
Finland did not directly take part in the war. However, the Russian occupant power did. 
And parts of Finland were occupied by Russian armed forces during the war. After the 
parliamentary majority declared the country independent from Russia in December 1917 
the Finish civil war during the spring of 1918 again forced the Finish economy to 
contract significantly. 
 
Table 1. Scale of per capita GDP slide during years of crises for the N4. 
Peak to bottom Denmark Finland  Norway Sweden 
      
World War I 1914-1918 1913-1918 1916-1918 1916-1918 
  -0.159 -0.347 -0.146 -0.135 
      
Post-World War I 1920-1921 1920-1921 1920-1921 1920-1921 
  -0.041 0.018 -0.108 -0.057 
      
Great Depression 1931-1932 1929-1933 1930-1932* 1929-1932 
  -0.036 -0.063 -0.044 -0.065 
          
Norway’s GDP was lower in 1931 than in 1932. However, this was a consequence of large-scale labour conflicts in 
1931. 
Sources, UN 2005, Statistics Denmark 2005, Statistics Finland 2005, Statistics Norway 2005, Statistics Sweden 2005, 
Krantz 2001, Hjerppe 2001, Grytten 2004, Hansen 1977, Maddison 2003. 
 
 
Denmark, Sweden, and in particular Norway were severely hit by the post-war depression 
of the early 1920s. The crisis occurred both as result of the international depression, 
which followed the over-heating of the economy up to the late summer 1920, and in 
consequence of a sharp reorientation from inflationary to deflationary monetary policy in 
order to restore the par silver values of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish currencies.  
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In Finland the wartime crisis had been so deep, that the country in fact experienced 
moderate growth in the early 1920s. In addition, Finland was not depending on the 
severely depressed British economy as did the other three. Finally, Finland did not run a 
strong deflationary monetary policy during the early 1920s. 
 
The great depression of the 1930s was surprisingly mild in all the N4 countries, with falls 
in GDP per capita of 3.6 to 6.5 per cent. At the same time GDP per capita fell by more 
than ten per cent in Western Europe and more than 30 per cent in the United States and 
Canada.3 The Nordic performance during the Great Depression is compared to the 
performance of 13 major Western powers (W13) in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Fall in GDP per capita during the Great Depression. 
  Fall in GDP per capita  High Low 
     
Australia 20.6 1925 1931 
Austria  23.4 1929 1933 
Belgium 10.0 1928 1934 
Canada 34.8 1928 1933 
France  13.3 1929 1935 
Germany 25.0 1929 1932 
Italy 6.4 1929 1934 
Japan 9.3 1929 1931 
Netherlands 16.0 1928 1934 
New Zealand 17.8 1929 1932 
Switzerland 6.7 1929 1935 
UK 6.6 1929 1931 
USA 30.8 1929 1933 
W13 17.0 1929 1933 
     
Denmark 3.6 1931 1932 
Finland 6.3 1929 1932 
Norway 4.4 1930 1932 
Sweden 6.5 1929 1932 
N4 5.2 1930 1932 
        
Sources, Maddison 2003, Krantz 2001, Grytten 2004. 
 
As seen from the table GDP in the Nordic countries contracted moderately compared to 
most other countries during the Great Depression. Again the Nordic development seems 
                                                
3 A. Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, (Paris 2003), pp. 62-68 and p. 88. 
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to fit well with the British performance, as GDP per capita in the UK decreased at about 
the same level as in the Nordic countries.  
 
In conclusion, the Nordic countries were moderately hit by the Great Depression of the 
1930s compared to other Western economies. In Denmark and Norway the crisis of the 
early 1930s seems to have been milder than that of the early 1920s, when in Sweden the 
two were at the same size. As for Finland, both the early 1920s and 1930s recessions 
were relatively mild, when the economy was hit devastatingly during the wartime.  
 
From inflation to deflation 
 
The recessions are also mirrored in the development of prices. In consequence of 
inflationary fiscal and monetary policy, a positive shift in aggregated demand for goods 
and services took place 1914-1920. Along with a negative shift in supply, due to lack of 
important products, this gave pace to inflation and depreciation of the national currencies. 
The rapid financial boom during 1919 and until summer 1920 later fuelled the inflation. 
Thereafter, the rapid inflation was turned to deflation in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
when Finland saw strong inflation in 1921 and a more moderate inflation in the rest of the 
1920s.4 Chart 2 reports consumer price developments for the N4 1920-1939.  
 
For Denmark, Norway and Sweden this chart clearly reveals that deflation was severe 
both in the 1920s and 1930s. As for Finland, she had inflation in the 1920s and, 
thereafter, strong deflation in the 1930s. Towards the last years of the 1930s all the four 
countries saw moderate inflation. The deflation of the early 1920s can be explained by 
both the strong international post war depression and deflationary monetary policy ran in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. This policy was monitored by the central banks in order 
to decrease prices and thereby increase the value of their currencies back to their par gold 
                                                
4 A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development, (Oxford 1982), pp. 238-239, O.H. Grytten, ”A 
Consumer Price Index for Norway 1516-2003”,  Ø. Eitrheim, J.T. Klovland and J. F. Qvigstad (eds), op.cit, 
(2004), pp. 47-98. 
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values as they were set in the 1870s. This policy was deemed necessary after six years of 
high inflation and monetary depreciation 1914-1920.5 
 
Chart 2. Consumer price indices for the Nordic countries 1920-1939 (1920=100). 
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Sources, Maddison 1982 , Grytten 2004b. 
 
In the early 1920s Finland, however, highly devastated by domestic and international 
conflicts, had given up the par gold value of the mark. Contrary to their Nordic 
neighbours they ran an inflationary monetary policy and saw high inflation. 6 After the 
post-war recession in the early 1920s, deflation was temporarily turned into inflation in 
Denmark and Norway after a short break in the tight policy. A new round of deflationary 
policy in the couple of years to follow, however, compensated for this new inflation. In 
the early 1930s deflation was significantly higher in Finland than in the other three 
economies, which contrary to Finland had experienced deflation for a decade.   
 
Unemployment 
                                                
5 H.C. Johansen, The Danish Economy in the Twentieth Century , (London 1987, L. Schön, En moderen 
svensk ekonomisk historia: tillväxt och omvandlingunder två sekel, (Stockholm 2001), pp. 25-32, T.J. 
Hanisch, ’Om virkninger av paripolitikken’ Historisk tidsskrift  58.3. (1979), pp. 239-267. 
6 R. Hjerppe, The Finnish Economy 1860 -1985. Growth and Structural Change , (Helsinki 1989), pp. 65-
66. 
  PAGE 9  
 
The 1930s are known as the decade of mass unemployment. Indeed unemployment was 
high. However, writers on the interwar labour market have had a tendency to inflate the 
problem. In the 1930s unemployment figures were more or less taken from randomly 
available sources. Major sources were unemployment schemes ran by labour insurance 
bodies. Most of these were connected to trade unions. These were later often taken as 
representative figures for the scale of interwar unemployment.  
 
However, their validity can indeed be questioned. In the first place the sources cover only 
fractions of the total labour force, i.e. insured trade unionists, most often working in 
industries, branches and firms most sensitive to business cycles. Hence, they tend to 
exaggerate the over-all rates of unemployment. During the last decades these figures have 
been revised for several countries in order to arrive at representative and comparable data 
for economy-wide unemployment.7 These new estimates reveal that unemployment rates 
still were high during the 1930s, but far below previous assumptions.  
 
Estimates of interwar unemployment with higher coverage have been calculated for 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden.8 However, some of these need revisions, and such are 
carried out here. As for Finland, however, we still lack comparable data for the economy-
wide labour force. Thus, we try to present such estimates along with revised figures for 
the other three Nordic economies here.  
 
Denmark 
 
For Denmark, Svend Aage Hansen has suggested a downward adjustment of the union-
figures by dividing them with a factor of two. 9 Niels Kærgaard, however, has proved 
                                                
7 A. Maddison, op. cit ., (1982), p. 206, W. Galenson and A. Zellner, ”International Comparison of 
Unemployment Rates”, W. Galenson and A. Zellner (eds),  The Measurement and Behaviour of 
Unemployment, (Princeton 1957), p. 455. 
8 A. Maddison, op. cit ., (1982), p. 206, S.A. Hansen, op. cit., (1977), p. 231, p. 327, O.H. Grytten, ‘The 
Scale of Interwar Unemployment in International Perspectiv’ Scandinavian Economic History Review  43.2. 
(1995), pp. 226-250. 
9 S.A. Hansen, op. cit ., (1977), p. 231, 327. 
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Hansen’s rates to be too high as indicator of total unemployment.10 The adjustment factor 
should rather fluctuate between two and three annually, depending on the business cycle, 
with the highest factor during recessions. Given the similarities in development between 
the Danish and the Norwegian economies and labour markets during the interwar period 
it seems reasonable to use the annual relative differences between the Norwegian trade 
union and total unemployment rates as adjustment factors for Denmark. By adopting the 
Norwegian ratio we arrive at representative and comparable total labour force 
unemployment rates for interwar Denmark. 
 
Finland 
 
Finland leaves us with a difficult challenge. There was no consistent and regular 
registrations of economy-wide unemployment for Finland during the 1930s. In his work 
on making interwar unemployment figures comparable Angus Maddison presents a series 
of Finnish interwar unemployment in percent of the entire labour force. The figures 
applied by Maddison were originally compiled by Kaarina Vattula.11 However, for the 
purpose of international comparison they are seemingly too low.  
 
Jarmo Peltola has calculated total unemployment with the help of several available 
sources. For the first years of the 1930s, the figures seem fairly reliable. However, before 
and after the early 1930s the sources are too poor to arrive at any satisfying numbers. The 
highest official record was made in February 1932 with 91.788 persons without work. 
The National Unemployment Committee concluded with between 110.000 and 120.000 
in late 1931.12 On this basis Peltola concludes with a peak in unemployment of 8.4 per 
cent in 1932.13 
 
                                                
10 N. Kærgaard, ‘Færre ledige – utopi eller virkelighed?’, Social forskning 12, (1992), pp. 5-6. 
11 A. Maddison, op. cit., (1982), p. 206. 
12 R. Hjeppe, op. cit., (1989), pp. 102-103. 
13 Peltola, Jarmo, “Why did the Unemployment Rate Vary? Finnish Interwar Unemployment in a 
Comparative International Context”, T. Myllyntaus (ed), Economic Crises and Restructuring in History: 
Experiences of Small Countries, (St. Katharinen 1998), p. 207. 
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By comparing the estimates by Pelto la with Maddison’s and Vattula’s for 1932 we arrive 
at a multiplier of 1.45. By using this on the established figures we reach at better series. 
However, for the 1920s the numbers still seem too low, as unemployment registration 
was close to nothing for these years. Thus, we use more reliable series for 1918 published 
by Peltola and use the 1918 multiplier, i.e. 2.5, on the Maddison/Vattula figures.  
 
Still we arrive at Finnish unemployment rates far below those for the other Nordic 
countries. This can basically been explained by the loss of manpower, and thus an inward 
shift in labour supply during the wars up to 1918, the reconstruction process of the 
country and the huge farm population, with more than 60 per cent of the labour force 
occupied in agriculture, less sensible for unemployment during recessions.14 
 
Norway 
 
Our Norwegian figures are taken from work on standardisation of international 
unemployment figures from the mid 1990s.15 These were later revised in 2000.16 The 
Norwegian figures of unemployment in the entire labour force are calculated on the basis 
of a detailed unemployment census with national coverage in connection to the 
population-census of December 1930.17 Some figures are added on the basis of an 
unemployment-census taken by registrations from the public labour exchanges (public 
labour offices) in January 1931.18 Together these two censuses give us a precise number 
of unemployed persons in Norway at the turn of the year (1930-1931).  
 
By using population and employment data from Statistics Norway we arrive at annual 
numbers for labour force and employment with December 1930 as base. 19 We thereafter 
                                                
14 R. Hjerppe, op. cit., (1989), pp. 95-106. 
15 O.H. Grytten, op. cit., (1995), pp. 226 -250. 
16 O.H. Grytten and C. Brautaset 2000, ‘Family Households and Unemployment in Norway During Years 
of Crisis: New Estimates 1926-1939’ The History of the Family 5.1. (2000), pp. 23-53. 
17 NOS IX. 61, Population Census for Norway. December 1st 1930, (Oslo 1935), pp. 14*-15*. 
18 NOS VIII. 165, Arbeidsledighetstellingen 15. januar 1931 ved de offentlige arbeidskontorer , (Oslo 
1931), pp. 11-31. 
19 NOS XII. 163, National Accounts 1865-1960, (Oslo 1965), pp. 328-329. 
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subtract the annual number of employed persons from the annual size of the labour force 
to find the numbers of unemployed in the 1930s. For the 1920s we have compiled data 
from labour exchanges and local unemployment reports kept at the national Archive and 
aggregated them up to national figures.20 Unreliable reports, reporting too high numbers 
according to the labour inspector and his staff, are omitted. 
 
Sweden 
 
As for Sweden, the sources limit us to a more simplified approach, i.e. estimating the 
difference between the trade union and the economy-wide unemployment rates. 
Compared to the census taken in March 1936 unemployment rates among insured trade 
unionists were 2.4 times higher than for the total.21 If we assume a constant factor for all 
years we arrive at adjusted figures for Sweden.  
 
However, this method gives too high rates for the early 1920s, as the ratio between trade 
union and over-all unemployment was not constant, but obviously significantly higher in 
the early 1920s than in 1936. Thus, we change the adjustment factor for these years with 
the relative difference of the similar Norwegian ratio of trade union to total 
unemployment in the early 1920s compared to the following years. 22 Hence, we use 3.2 
as downward adjustment factor for Sweden in 1921 and 1922, and arrive at revised 
unemployment rates for the entire Swedish inter-war labour force.  
 
Economy-wide unemployment in the N4 
 
Table 3 clearly reveals significant revisions of the unemployment figures in order to 
make them representative for the entire labour force. The new estimates suggest that 
Denmark and Norway had higher unemployment rates than Finland and Sweden during 
the 1920s, when the relative increase in unemployment was higher in the two latter in the 
                                                
20 National Archive of Norway, Unemployment reports given to the Inspector of Labour 1919-1941. 
21 A. Maddison, Economic Growth in the West: Comparative Experience in Europe and North America, 
(London 1964), pp. 216-222. 
22 O.H. Grytten, op. cit., (1995), pp. 241 -245. 
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1930s. Still, Denmark and Norway seem to have had the highest unemployment rates, 
when Finland, as explained above, naturally had the lowest of the N4 due to its huge 
agricultural sector. 
 
Table 3. Unemployment in per cent of total labour force and trade union unemployment 
schemes for the N4 1920-1939. 
  Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
      
  Total labour force 
1920 2.5 2.8 1.7 2.2 
1921 7.6 4.5 6.8 8.3 
1922 8.5 3.5 7.5 7.2 
1923 6.7 2.5 5.6 5.2 
1924 5.3 3.0 4.2 4.2 
1925 6.3 5.0 5.7 4.5 
1926 7.4 4.0 8.7 5.0 
1927 7.9 3.8 8.9 5.0 
1928 7.7 3.8 7.9 4.4 
1929 7.0 4.1 7.0 4.2 
1930 5.7 5.8 7.0 4.9 
1931 8.2 6.7 10.2 7.0 
1932 10.9 8.4 10.6 9.3 
1933 9.3 7.6 10.8 9.6 
1934 7.4 6.4 10.3 7.5 
1935 7.7 5.4 9.9 6.2 
1936 8.9 3.9 8.7 5.2 
1937 8.0 3.8 7.3 4.5 
1938 6.7 3.8 6.8 4.5 
1939 5.8  5.7 3.8 
      
  Trade union unemployment schemes 
1920 6.1  2.3 5.4 
1921 19.7  17.6 26.6 
1922 19.3  17.1 22.9 
1923 12.7  10.6 12.5 
1924 10.7  8.5 10.1 
1925 14.7  13.2 11.0 
1926 20.7  24.3 12.2 
1927 22.5  25.4 12.0 
1928 18.5  19.1 10.6 
1929 15.5  15.4 10.2 
1930 13.7  16.6 11.9 
1931 17.9  22.3 16.8 
1932 31.7  30.8 22.4 
1933 28.8  33.4 23.2 
1934 22.2  30.7 18.0 
1935 19.7  25.3 15.0 
1936 19.3  18.8 12.7 
1937 21.9  20.0 10.8 
1938 21.5  22.0 10.9 
1939 18.4  18.3 9.2 
          
Sources, Grytten 1995, p. 247, Grytten and Brautaset 2000, pp. 47-50 and present estimates. 
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Table 4 reports unemployment rates in 15 Western countries, including the Scandinavian 
countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. They truly reveal a puzzle, as when 
the depression in the Nordic countries stayed relatively mild in the 1930s, unemployment 
was high and close to the Western average. In other words the sca le of unemployment 
does not seem to reflect the scale of the depression. 
 
Table 4. Unemployment as per cent of labour force.  
  1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
            
Australia 8.2 13.1 17.9 19.1  17.4 15.0 12.5 9.9 8.1 8.1 
Austria  5.5 7.0 9.7 13.7  16.3 16.1 15.2 15.2 13.7 8.1 
Belgium 0.8 2.2 6.8 11.9  10.6 11.8 11.1 8.4 7.2 8.7 
Canada 2.9 9.1 11.6 17.6  19.3 14.5 14.2 12.8 9.1 11.4 
France  1.2 2.0 2.2 3.0 4.0 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.7 
Germany 5.9 9.5 13.9 17.2  14.8 8.3 6.5 4.0 2.7 1.3 
Italy 1.7 2.5 4.3 5.8 5.9 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 
Netherlands 1.7 2.3 4.3 8.3 9.7 9.8 11.2 11.9 10.5 9.9 
Switzerland 0.4 0.7 1.2 2.8 3.5 3.3 4.2 4.7 3.6 3.3 
UK 7.5 11.2 15.1 15.6  14.1 11.9 11.9 9.4 7.8 9.3 
USA 3.2 8.7 15.3 22.9  20.6 16.0 14.2 9.9 9.1 12.5 
Average W11 3.5 6.2 9.3 12.5  12.4 10.6 10.1 8.7 7.3 7.4 
            
Denmark 7.0 5.7 8.2 10.9  9.3 7.4 7.7 8.9 8.0 6.7 
Finland 4.1 5.8 6.7 8.4 7.6 6.4 5.4 3.9 3.8 3.8 
Norway 7.0 7.0 10.2 10.6  10.8 10.3 9.9 8.7 7.3 6.8 
Sweden 4.2 4.2 7.0 9.3 9.6 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 4.5 
Average N4 5.6 5.7 8.0 9.8 9.3 7.9 7.3 6.7 5.9 5.4 
                      
Sources, Maddison 1982, p. 206, Grytten 1995, p. 247, Grytten and Brautaset 2000 and present calculations. 
 
Why a relatively mild depression in the Nordic countries? 
 
Two central questions can then be connected to the economic performance of the Nordic 
countries in the 1930s. First we may ask why they experienced a milder depression than 
most other Western countries. Secondly, given the relatively sound performance, why did 
unemployment stay persistently high in the Nordic countries during the 1930s? In this 
section we will focus on the first of these questions.  
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Several factors can be put forward to explain the favourable performance of the Nordic 
economies in the 1930s. Some may be connected to the market forces and some to 
economic policy. 
 
Market explanations  
 
From the market side it is difficult to explain the good Nordic performance with high 
international demand, as the world trade sunk by two thirds in the early 1930s. It is a fact 
that the Nordic countries had lower contraction in exports than most other economies 
during the depression years and thereafter higher exports growth and a higher degree of 
import substitution.  
 
The relatively good Nordic performance has been analysed as Schumpeterian supply side 
matter.23 During the years of depression, entrepreneurs had to come up with new 
innovations in order to survive. New technology was utilised in the manufacturing 
industry. Production became more efficient and was better matched with the actual 
demand. Nordic manufacturing industry was by this able to operate at larger markets. In 
addition, cost efficient production gave competitive advantage to Nordic companies. 
Thus, exports increased and import substitution took place.   
 
A problem with this explanation is that despite entrepreneurial activity in the 1930s, the 
new manufacturing industries did not have their breakthrough in the 1930s. Rather, new 
capital- intensive manufacturing industry had much of its breakthrough in the decades 
before, when the new industry from the 1930s had its breakthrough after the Second 
World War. Despite this counter argument we do see signs of building new industries 
during the Great Depression, and we find industrial areas, e.g. Western Norway, where 
there was a significant growth in new industries as furniture, bicycles and lighter 
consumption industry. It is also argued on empirically basis that the Nordic economies 
                                                
23 E. Dahmèn, Svensk industriell företaksomhet, (Lund 1950), L. Schön, ”Industiral Crises in a Modell of 
Long Cycles” in T. Myllyntaus (ed), Economic Crises and Restructuring in History: Experiences of Small 
Countries, (St. Katharinen 1998), pp. 404-409, F. Sejersted, Vekst gjennom krise. Studier i norsk 
teknologihistorie , (Oslo 1982). 
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did better than most other economies with respect to both exports and import 
substitution. 24 
 
Thus, we will not out-rule the possibility of Schumpeterian contribution to the way out of 
the 1930s-crisis. But, rather, we will seek to examine other possibly more important 
factors for the recovery. In this article we take a closer look at economic policy.  
 
Market regulation 
 
During the depression the Nordic countries took measures to regulate markets to solve 
the problem of over production in the market. The governments of the Nordic countries 
in particular intervened into agriculture. Several writers on Nordic economic history have 
investigated into the market intervention policy of the 1930s.25 The conventional 
conclusion seems to be that agriculture benefited from the intervention. The supply 
surplus was brought down by the creation of cartels controlling the production side, by 
subsidies to decrease stocks and increase of import tariffs, all in order to obtain higher 
product prices than the equilibrium price in a free market.  
 
In Norway parliament decided a compulsory addition of butter into margarine as an 
important tool to get rid of the excess milk production. 26 Paradoxically, Denmark 
prevented addition of margarine into butter to solve a similar problem.27 Since milk was 
the major agricultural product these measures became quite efficient from the producers 
view. On the demand side higher prices on necessary milk products caused a loss to 
consumers. However, during a time of deflation and later moderate inflation, they 
                                                
24 E. Bjørtvedt and C. Venneslan, Veien ut av krisa’, Historisk tidsskrift  71.2. (1998), p. 106, O.H. Grytten, 
“Monetary Policy and Restructuring of the Norwegian Economy during Years of Crises, 1920-1939” in T. 
Myllyntaus, Timo (ed), op. cit.,  (1998),  pp. 119-121. 
25 S.A. Nilsson, K. Hildebrand, K. and B. Øhngren (eds), Kriser och krispolitikk i Norden under 
mellankrigstiden , (Uppsala 1974). 
26 E. Hovland, ’Smør og margarin blir et fett’, Historisk tidsskrift  58.3. (1979), pp. 305-325. 
27 V. Dybdahl et al, Krise i Danmark. Strukturændringer og krisepolitikk i 1930’erne, (København 1974), 
E.H. Pedersen, E. H. et al, ”Nordens jordbruk under världskrisen 1929-1933” in S.A. Nilsson, K. 
Hildebrand and B. Øhngren (eds), op. cit., (1974), pp. 155-207. 
  PAGE 17  
probably didn’t pay to much attention to this negative effect on their consumption 
possibilities. 
 
We do not question that the protected industries benefited from the governmental 
inference. However, there must have been a consumption loss, due to higher prices and 
less efficient equilibrium solutions than in free markets. This has also been demonstrated 
by quantitative empirical research. 28 However, the marginal consumption propensity was 
low. Thus, it is not obvious that the consumption loss led to any significant reduction in 
demand for other products. Hence, giving pace to key industries may have caused net-
multiplication effects to the rest of the production side of the economy. 
 
Fiscal policy 
 
During the 1930s the social democrats had gained governmental power in all the four 
Nordic countries included in this analysis. Denmark was first to go, after a short lived 
social democratic government led by Thorvald Stauning in the mid 1920s, the social 
democrats gained power together with the radical liberals 1929-1940, again under 
Stauning’s leadership. In Sweden Per Albin Hansson became the first prime minister of a 
44-year social democratic rule from 1932. Johan Nygaardsvold became the first 
Norwegian social democrat to form a permanent government after an agreement with the 
Farmer’s Party in 1935. As for Finland, the social democrats first gained governmental 
power under the leadership of Väinö Tanner in 1926-1927. Thereafter, they were held out 
of office by several coalitions until 1937, when they joined a centre-left coalition.  
 
During the first decades after the Second World War, there was a common attitude 
among writers on Scandinavian economic history that the Keynesian revolution gained 
power in the Scandinavian countries during the social democratic take over in the 1930s. 
Thus, active fiscal policy made the business cycle improve during the last part of the 
1930s.  
                                                
28 O.H. Grytten, ”The Consumer’s  Burden – What did regulations of the Norwegian milk market in the 
1930s cost consumers?” in B.L. Basberg, H.W. Nordvik and G. Stang (eds), I det lange løp, (Bergen 1997), 
pp. 143-164. 
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From the 1970s onwards, however, this view has been challenged by many scholars.29 It 
is indeed difficult to trace any persistent deficit budgeting policy during the 1930s in any 
of the Nordic countries. There was a significant growth in the public sector. However, 
this increase was levelled out by higher taxes. Thus, in this respect, the net effect on 
demand was neutral. On the other hand, the marginal propensities to consume and save 
differed from the public to the private sector. Empirical evidence from Norway reflects 
that the marginal propensity to consume was higher in the public sector than in the 
private.30 Thus, cet par the relative growth in the public sector had a positive impact on 
demand. Nevertheless, due to budget discipline and moderate multiplier effects the fiscal 
policy in Norway under the Labour Party rule in the 1930s was neutral. 31 In sum, fiscal 
policy seems to have played a minor, if any, role for the relative good performance of the 
Nordic economies during the 1930s. 
 
Monetary policy 
 
We are then left to investigate possible effects caused by monetary policy. After UK was 
forced off gold September 21st 1931, Norway and Sweden followed six days later. 
Denmark clung to gold another two days, when Finland suspended gold redemption 
October 12th. This early non- intentional move from gold made the N4 some of the first 
countries to give up their tight monetary policy, opposite from the situation in the 1920s.  
 
When other countries concentrated on clinging to gold, the suspension countries were 
able to run a more inflationary monetary policy. This had positive effects on both the 
domestic markets and the foreign sector. The domestic effect of abandoning gold was 
leaving a deflationary for an inflationary monetary policy. The money supply did then 
                                                
29 M. Larsson, En svensk ekonomisk historia, (Stockholm 1991), pp. 104-121, H.C. Johansen, ’The Danish 
Economy in the Crossroads between Scandinavia and Europe’, Journal of Scandinavian History 18.1. 
(1993), p. 43, F. Hodne, The Norwegian Economy 1815-1970, (Trondheim 1975), pp. 441-445. 
30 H.W. Nordvik, ’Finanspolitikken og den offentlige sektors rolle’, Historisk tidsskrift 58.3. (1979), pp. 
223-236. 
31 M. Værholm,  En empirisk etterprøving av den norske finans- og pengepolitikken i mellomkrigstiden , 
(Bergen 2003), pp. 58-71. 
  PAGE 19  
increase, and thus a positive shift in aggregated product demand. This caused an increase 
in production. The real interest rate effect was of great importance in this respect. 
Leaving gold and monitoring a more inflationary monetary policy led the central banks to 
lower their interest rates. This gave higher economic activity. Thereby deflation was 
turned into moderate inflation. Along with lower interest rates this caused real interest 
rates to fall significantly. Together with more optimism and higher future expectations to 
the economy lower interest rates gave important incitements to invest.  
 
The transition to a more inflationary monetary policy also had important effects on the 
foreign sector. Leaving gold was followed by depreciation of currencies. Everything else 
held constant, this meant relatively lower prices on products from the depreciation 
countries and by that an improvement of cost efficiency. Thus, both an increase in 
exports and import substitution would naturally take place. Foreign trade statistics 
definitely reveal that the export performance of the N4 was quite good in the 1930s. This 
is clearly shown in chart 3.  
 
Chart 3. Export volumes (1913=100). 
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Source, Maddison 1995. 
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The chart clearly reveals that the Nordic economies saw a more moderate decline in 
exports than the western economies in general and than in the global economy during the 
crisis. Also, exports grew relatively rapidly in the N4 during the recovery period in the 
second part of the 1930s. However, one has to emphasis that the rates of growth in 
exports fluctuated significantly among the Northern economies. Finland and Norway had 
the most impressive performance, Sweden had a significant fall in exports during the first 
years of the international trade crisis, but did clearly better than most other countries 
thereafter, when Denmark struggled with regaining the level of foreign trade in the entire 
1930s, as reported in chart 4. This implies that increase of foreign trade cannot 
sufficiently explain the relatively good GDP performance of all the N4.   
 
Chart 4. Export volumes for the N4 (1913=100).  
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Sources, Maddison 1982, Krantz 2001, Hjerppe 1996, Grytten 2004. 
 
As for import substitution, this can directly be mirrored in imports as share of GDP. 
However, when comparing between high and low performance economies this measure 
may be irrelevant. Good economic performance allows an economy to increase its 
imports. And moving from depression to growth makes foreign trade increase its relative 
share of GDP. Thus, relative import substitution is not easy to measure. Since the Nordic 
economies performed better than most other countries their imports also increased 
relatively to most other economies.  
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The rapid Nordic revival after the international crises also made the share of foreign trade 
increase relative to those still fighting the depression. A way of measuring relative import 
substitution would then be trade balance. If imports decreased relative to exports in the 
Nordic countries compared to other countries this give us a track of import substitution. 
Table 5 reports exports and imports of goods for 17 Western economies 1929-1935 as 
percentages of GDP in current prices. 
 
Table 5. Exports and imports of goods in percent of GDP. 
  1929 1931 1933 1935 1929 1931 1933 1935 
           
  Exports Imports 
Australia 8.1 7.0 7.8 7.3 7.6 4.8 5.1 5.8 
Austria  18.1 12.5 8.6 9.8 27.0 20.9 12.7  13.2 
Belgium 39.3  27.9 31.8 46.8  28.4 34.4 
Canada 19.2 12.8 15.3 17.2 21.2 13.4 11.5  12.8 
France  14.5 10.2 7.4 7.6 16.8 14.1 11.4  10.3 
Germany 17.0 16.4 8.6 5.9 16.8 11.5 7.4 5.8 
Italy 10.6 9.2 6.1 4.7 15.3 10.5 7.5 7.0 
Japan 16.0 11.8 16.4 19.6 17.0 13.5 17.2  19.6 
Netherlands 30.9 24.0 15.8 15.2 42.6 34.5 26.2  20.9 
New Zealand  34.4 37.3 36.1  26.5 25.3  29.0 
Switzerland 21.0 14.7 10.4 10.2 27.3 24.6 19.5  16.0 
United Kingdom 17.2 9.8 9.8 10.2 28.7 21.6 17.9  18.0 
USA 5.1 3.2 3.0 3.2 4.3 2.8 2.7 3.3 
West 17.0 12.5 10.1 10.4 21.70 16.7 13.4  12.7 
  1.000 0.735 0.598 0.611 1.000 0.771 0.618 0.585 
           
Denmark 27.9 23.5 21.1 19.0 29.6 26.3 22.3  20.2 
Finland 24.3 20.9 22.9 22.7 26.4 16.2 17.0  19.4 
Norway 17.3 12.2 14.4 13.9 24.7 22.4 17.2  18.9 
Sweden 18.8 13.1 13.6 13.8 18.5 16.7 13.8  16.0 
N4 22.1 17.4 18.0 17.4 24.8 20.4 17.6  18.6 
  1.000 0.789 0.815 0.786 1.000 0.823 0.709 0.751 
                  
Relative shares compared to 1929 in brackets, where 1929=1. 
* Australia, Belgium and New Zealand are excluded from the mean. 
Source, Grytten 1999, p 119. 
 
 
The table clearly shows that the Nordic countries, and in particular Finland and Norway 
were well performers when it comes to trade surplus as an indication for import 
substitution. The relative development can easier bee seen in a histogram. Chart 7 gives 
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trade surplus of goods as share of GDP in 1931, 1933 and 1935 relative to the trade 
surplus of goods as share of GDP in 1929. The histogram indicates that a huge import 
substitution took place in the N4 compared to the rest of the Western world between 1929 
and 1933. Virtually all of this effect of this effect was taken out after 1931, in other 
words after the abandonment of gold. When the Scandinavian countries thereafter joined 
the Sterling Area in 1933, the monetary policy became tighter and the rapid depreciation 
of the Scandinavian currencies to other currencies stopped. Thus, the relative import 
substitution advantage declined, as mirrored in the histogram.  
 
Chart 5. Relative changes in trade surplus as share of GDP.  
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Source, Grytten 1999, p. 119. 
 
One should also note that the level of import substitution varied significantly among the 
N4. This is evident from table 6, which reports the relative trade surpluses as share of 
GDP for the four Nordic countries. 
 
Table 6. Trade surpluses as share of GDP for the N4. 
  Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Nordic West 
        
1931 -0.046 0.246 -0.202 -0.206 -0.033 -0.037 
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1933 0.003 0.298 0.136 -0.023 0.107 -0.020 
1935 -0.001 0.199 0.038 -0.131 0.035 0.026 
              
Source, Grytten 1999, p. 119. 
 
International examination 
 
The effects of the monetary policy on both the domestic and the foreign sector can be 
analysed more carefully by a more detailed comparison of key aggregates. Work by 
Barry Eichengreen already confirms that internationally monetary policy played an 
important role for the depth of and the recovery from The Great Depression. 32 
 
Here we use data from the same 17 Western economies as used above. The domestic 
effect of inflationary monetary is admittedly difficult to measure empirically, as the 
Keynesian view would be that a positive shift in product demand is mirrored in a positive 
effect on GDP. Thus, using this chain of argument an empirical “evidence” would be that 
inflationary monetary caused GDP to grow because product demand, measured as GDP, 
grew. Hence, we have to find other ways of examining this possible relationship.  
 
One possible relationship could be through international comparisons of GDP 
performance and exchange rates. What happened to the domestic markets in countries 
that left gold compared to those still on? Since deflationary monetary policy went hand in 
hand with depreciation policy we can use exchange rates as measure of inflationary or 
deflationary monetary policy. Thus, was the performance of depreciation countries 
superior to that of the appreciation countries?  
 
In the same way we can examine the effects of the foreign markets by looking at the 
relationship between exchange rates and exports and exchange rates and import 
substitution. This is all done in table 7, which reports the estimated simple log- log 
regression coefficients between the developments of exchange rates as independent 
variable, and GDP per capita, exports and relative trade surpluses as dependent variables. 
                                                
32 B. Eichengreen, Elusive Stability: Essays in the Hi story of International Finance 1919 -1939 , 
(Cambridge 1993). 
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The table also reports some simple regressions with exchange rates as independent 
variable and the other three as dependent.  
 
Table 7. Estimated relations between exchange rates and key macro economic indicators.  
Simple log-log regressions with exchange rates (lnE-1) as independent variable. 
Dep var Intercept ß1 Std error R2 
      
ln?Y(1933/1929) 5.584 -0.251 0.113 0.247 
   (-2.216)**   
      
ln?Y(1935/1929) 5.232 -0.159 0.087 0.181 
   (-1.822)*    
      
ln?X(1933/1929) 8.669 -0.999 0.216 0.589 
   (-4.636)***   
      
ln?X(1935/1929) 8.874 -1.068 0.157 0.755 
   (-6.796)***   
      
ln(?X/M)(1933/1929) 5.644 -0.225 0.211 0.071 
   (-1.067)   
      
ln(?X/M)(1935/1929) 5.345 -0.171 0.114 0.131 
   (-1.503)   
          
* Significant at 10 per cent level  
** Significant at 5 per cent level  
*** Significant at 1 per cent level 
 
 
Table 7 clearly emphasises the importance of monetary policy to economic growth and 
exports performance. Those countries, which left gold early in the 1930s, i.e. the Sterling 
Area, including Scandinavia, were well performers, when we see falling performance 
along with the level of tight monetary policy, making the US and the Gold Block to 
suffer the most. As for import substitution the results are not that evident. This may partly 
be result of the problem of isolating and operationalise import substitution in our data. 
However, on the basis of the examination above, it seems pretty clear that the economies 
leaving gold early benefited from this in respect of production, exports and import 
substitution. Thus, an unintended shift of the monetary policy from tight to inflationary 
direction letting the exchange rates depreciate significantly contributes to explain why the 
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N4 performed better than most other economies in the 1930s. The policy made the 
recession milder and shorter, and the recovery faster.   
 
Why did unemployment stay high? 
 
Despite the N4 were relative well performers during the 1930s, unemployment stayed 
persistently high into the Second World War. We do not argue that the labour market 
situation developed favourable in the Nordic countries compared to those, which still 
maintained their currency fixed to gold at par value. It has been argued in several articles 
that those economies, which left gold early, had a better development in the 
unemployment situation than the countries clinging longer to gold.33 
 
Demand side explanation 
 
Unemployment increased significantly during the big fall of output in the early 1930s. 
Thus, there clearly is a Keynesian explanation for this dramatic increase in 
unemployment both in the Nordic countries and in the rest of the Western world. 
However, the decline in unemployment after the recession was not symmetric to the rise 
during the years of crisis. Unemployment did not fall rapidly during the rapid recovery of 
from 1933 onwards. This is not a straightforward task to explain why. A common view 
among historians has been that the deep depression, with its negative shift in product 
demand, was followed by a correspondingly negative shift in employment in the 1930s. 
This caused unemployment to stay high. As already mentioned we agree that this is a 
plausible explanation for the recession years during the first part of the decade. However, 
it can hardly explain the high levels during the rest of the decade. If lack of product 
demand and, thus, lack of labour demand was the case, there should have been none or 
marginal growth in employment even during the recovery period. But this was simply not 
the case. In fact employment increased rapidly in the Nordic economies after the bottom 
line of the recession was reached in mid and late 1932.  
 
                                                
33 B. Eichengreen, op. cit., (1990), pp. 215-238. 
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The number of annual man-years performed in the N4 economies increased rapidly in the 
1930s. According to Angus Maddison the annual growth rate of employment for the N4 
1929-1938 was over 1.2 per cent. In comparison, the rate of employment growth in the 
golden era of the 1950s and 1960s, with only one percent recorded unemployment rates, 
was less than 0.5 per cent. 34 Admittedly the growth rates differed significantly, with 
Denmark, Finland and Norway all close to 1.5 per cent and Sweden with only minor 
growth. For the N4, less Sweden, this in fact makes the 1930s as one of the decades with 
the highest expansion in employment ever. Hence, we cannot use a Keynesian demand 
explanation as a relevant measure to explain the persistently high unemployment rates in 
the N4 in the last six or seven years leading up to the great war. 
 
Supply side explanation 
 
If we cannot find plausible explanations on the demand side, we have to examine the 
supply side of the labour market. Can any event on the supply side explain the 
persistently high level of unemployment in the N4 during the 1930s despite their 
relatively good performance? To be able to answer this question, we first look at the 
development of the labour force. Again, we find a rapid growth 1928-1939, with an 
annual rate of almost 1.2, against 0.6 per cent during the golden era in the 1950s and 
1960s. Like the situation for employment, the growth in the N4’s labour force 1929-1938 
is one of the highest ever collected.35 Thus, it seems as the persistently high 
unemployment rates in the second half of the 1930s can be explained by a significant 
positive shift in the supply of labour. However, also in this case we will have to comment 
that Sweden followed somewhat different pattern from the rest of the N4, in as much as 
the growth of the Swedish labour force was quite moderate compared to those of the 
other N4 countries. 
 
Monetary policy serves as an explanation for the development of unemployment, i.e. 
those economies monitoring a tight monetary policy experienced increase in 
                                                
34 A. Maddison, op. cit., (1982), p. 210. 
35 A. Maddison, op. cit., (1982), p. 209. 
  PAGE 27  
unemployment compared to those monitoring a less tight monetary policy. 36 However, it 
cannot explain why unemployment, despite relative improvement, stayed persistently 
high in the depreciation countries. In fact, some of the depreciatio n countries still had 
significantly higher unemployment rates at the end of the decade than some of the gold 
countries. Admittedly, the rates were converging, but still some of the well performers 
had the highest unemployment rates. Hence, we examine the growth of the labour force 
in different economies in order to find out its effect on the level of unemployment. A 
possible relationship between unemployment and growth in labour force is shown in a 
plot diagram in chart 6 below. 
 
As we read the chart, those countries with the highest growth in labour supply clearly 
tended to have the highest unemployment rates in the 1930s. This also happened to be the 
case for Denmark, Finland and Norway, which were three of the countries with the 
highest growth in labour supply during the 1930s. Sweden, however, saw a significantly 
lower growth in their labour force. This contributes to explain why unemployment stayed 
lower in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway despite Sweden’s relative inferior 
performance during the decade.  
 
Why then did the labour force grow this rapidly in Denmark, Finland and Norway? A 
major explanation is the change of immigration policy in North America. In 1924 the 
United States introduced limitations on immigration. In consequence, the number of 
immigrants from the N4 was reduced by about 50 per cent. Further more, in 1930 an 
almost complete immigration ban was introduced. Canada followed in the footsteps of 
the US, and, thus, only a few hundred persons annually moved from the N4 to North 
America dur ing the 1930s.  
 
In fact, it was positive net migration from North America to the Scandinavian countries 
in this decade. In consequence of this shift from strong net emigration to net immigration 
to the N4, around 50.000 excess workers were thrown into the  Nordic labour markets 
                                                
36 B. Eichengreen, op. cit., (1990), pp. 215-238, O.H. Grytten, op. cit., (1999), p. 93-124. 
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annually. During the decade these made up an excess supply of the labour supply of 
about half a million or about seven per cent of the initial labour force.37 
 
Chart 6. Plot diagram of average unemployment rates and growth in labour force 
(LF1938/LF1929) 1929-1938. 
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Sources, Present calculations, Maddison 1982, p. 209 and Grytten 1994, p. 247. 
To obtain comparable figures, the unemployment rates for Belgium and Austria are adjusted downwards by a half, and 
for Australia by a quarter.  
 
In addition, during the inter-war years the birth rates fell dramatically. When the Nordic 
birth rates reached about 25 per 1000 inhabitants in 1919 it was around 14 in 1935.38 In 
consequence, the number of persons over 15 increased compared to the number of 
children and also compared to the total population. Thus, labour supply stepped up 
compared to consumers, and caused unemployment.  
 
                                                
37 M. Tuveng, Arbeidsløshet og beskjeftigelse i Norge før og under krigen , (Bergen 1948), pp. 80-88, O.H. 
Grytten, An Empirical Analysis of the Norwegian Labour Market, 1918 -1939: Norwegian Interwar 
Unemployment in International Perspective, (Bergen 1994), pp. 268-289. 
38 NOS XII. 245, Historical Statistics 1968, (Oslo 1969), pp. 45-47. 
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In conclusion, we see that the persistently high unemployment rates in the Nordic 
countries despite their rapid recovery seems to be a demographic phenomenon, i.e. 
immigration ban to North-America from 1930 onwards and low birth rates in 1920s and 
particular in the 1930s. These two factors made labour supply increase significantly 
compared to the number of consumers. Hence, unemployment stayed high due to a strong 
positive shift in labour supply. 
 
Summary 
 
The present paper raises two questions. Firstly, why did the Nordic countries, Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden (N4) have a milder and shorter depression and a more rapid 
recovery than most other Western economies during the 1930s? Here we seek to find the 
impact of economic policy on the performance. Secondly, given that the N4 performed 
better than most other economies, why did Nordic unemployment persist on a high level 
throughout the decade? 
 
The paper seeks to answer these questions by an international comparative approach, 
where key macro and monetary policy indicators of the N4 are put into an analysis of 17 
Western countries. In order to carry out this analysis revised figures of total labour force 
unemployment are presented. 
 
The early suspension of gold in September and October 1931 by the N4 stimulated both 
the domestic and the foreign sectors of the Nordic economies. Thus, the crisis became 
milder and shorter and the recovery more rapid than in most other countries. The paradox 
of rapid recovery and persistently high unemployment can basically be explained by two 
demographic factors. The immigration ban into North America canalised half a million 
excess workers into the Nordic labour markets, and thus a positive shift in labour supply 
took place. In addition the combination of a dramatic decline in birth rates and the halt in 
overseas emigration of young adults gave a relative increase of labour supply to the 
number of consumers. Hence, unemployment stayed high despite the business cycle was 
better than in most other countries. 
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The paper finally concludes that Sweden was somewhat different from the other N4, with 
a slower recovery. However, Swedish unemployment was not higher in the second half of 
the 1930s than for the total N4. This was due to lower growth in Swedish labour supply. 
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